Goldmann was sharply critical of the Israeli government of Menachem Begin. He decried what he saw as Israels denial of the original Zionist vision, He rejected the claim of some Israelis that they must occupy Greater Israel because it was promised to them by God. He called this thesis a profanation. Goldmann understood the need for US support. He lived in the United States for more than 20 years and knew American Jewry well. In 1969 he wrote approvingly of Zionist political action in the United States: It is not fair to single out Zionist pressure for censure. Democracy consists of a multiplicity of pressure-exerting forces, each of which is trying to make itself felt. Near the end of his life, however, Goldmanns views of the pro-Israel lobby changed. In 1980 he warned: Blind support of the Begin government may be more menacing for Israel than any danger of Arab attack. American Jewry is more generous than any other group in American life and is doing great things... But by misusing its political influence, by exaggerating the aggressiveness of the Jewish lobby in Washington, by giving the Begin regime the impression that the Jews are strong enough to force the American administration and Congress to follow every Israeli desire, they lead Israel on a ruinous path which, if continued, may lead to dire consequences. He blamed the Israeli lobby for US failures to bring about a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. It was to a very large degree because of electoral considerations, fear of the pro-Israel lobby, and of the Jewish vote. He warned of trouble ahead if the lobby continued its present course. It is now slowly becoming something of a negative factor. Not only does it distort the expectations and political calculations of Israel, but the time may not be far off when American public opinion will be sick and tired of the demands of Israel and the aggressiveness of American Jewry. In 1978, two years before he wrote his alarmed evaluation of the Israeli lobby, New York magazine reported that Goldmann had privately urged officials of the Carter administration to break the back of the lobby: Goldmann pleaded with the administration to stand firm and not back off from confrontations with the organised Jewish community as other administrations had done. Unless this was done, he argued, President Carters plans for a Middle East settlement would die in stillbirth. His words were prophetic. The comprehensive settlement Carter sought was frustrated by the intransigence of Israel and its US lobby. President Ronald Reagan revived the idea of a comprehensive Middle East peace just four days before Goldmanns death in September 1982. A state funeral was conducted in Israel. As Klutznick, Israeli Labor Party leaders Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and others stood on Israels Mount Herzl awaiting the great Zionist leaders burial alongside the five other former presidents of the World Zionist Organisation, the conversation centred on the Reagan plan, which Prime Minister Begin had already rejected. Symbolic of organised Jewrys reaction to Goldmanns life was the response of the Israeli government to his death. Begin gave permission for the burial but did not attend. In a strikingly empty commentary on the life of a man who had done so much to bring Israel into being and give it strength, Acting Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich said only, We regret that a man of so many virtues and abilities went the wrong way. It was a callous epitaph for one of Israels great pioneers. You Must Listen When We Speak Ill At 7:45 A.M. the towering John Hancock Building in Chicagos downtown loop area was just beginning to come to life. On the fortieth floor were the offices of Philip Klutznick attorney. developer, former US secretary of commerce, president emeritus of Bnai Brith, organizer and former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations, president emeritus of the World Jewish Congress. At that hour only Philip Klutznick was at work. He was on the phone, seated on a sofa at one end of his spacious office, his back to a panoramic view of the building across the street where he and his wife make their home. On the walls were autographed photographs of the seven presidents of the United States under whom he has served. This morning, in the fall of 1983, he was talking with Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypts ambassador to the United States and a friend of many years. Ghorbal was preparing for a visit to the United States by his leader, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. He wanted to make sure the right people would be available to meet with him. The right people included Klutznick. Klutznicks vigorous appearance and unrelenting pace belie his seventy-six years. His deep, rich voice echoes around the near-empty offices. His eyes smile through heavy glasses, and his firm, confident manner is that of a man in the prime of life. But his apparent confidence about the flexibility of US Jews belies his own experience working within and outside the establishment for sixty years. A visitor sharing coffee and conversation would never guess that this short, handsome, optimistic man whose persistence and spirit helped to create Israel, pay its bills and provide its arms had become, in the eyes of many Jews, a virtual castaway. Measured by offices held and services rendered, his credentials in the Jewish establishment are impeccable. But in the eyes of most Jewish leaders, he is guilty of a cardinal sin: daring publicly to challenge Israeli government policy. This puts him at odds with the very Jewish organisations he did so much to bring into being. He speaks from a base of confidence that includes business success, public office in both Democratic and Republican administrations, and high honors in the Jewish community. After seeing his savings wiped out by the Great Depression, he recovered, became a successful community developer, a millionaire, a leader of the Jewish community, and a diplomat. In early years he worked to bring strength and unity to the Jewish community, a quest that took on urgency in 1942 when word arrived of Adolf Hitlers barbaric program to annihilate European Jews. Henry Monsky, an Omaha lawyer and president of Bnai Brith, convened a meeting in Pittsburgh, inviting the membership of 41 major Jewish organisations. This gathering, identified as the American Jewish Conference, marked the first serious effort to unite U.S. Jews against the Holocaust. You know, we are an unusual group of people, Klutznick chuckles. We fight over anything. This time the fight was over whether Jews would back the establishment of a national homeland. Monsky, the first committed Zionist to head Bnai Brith, pulled the organisation from its neutral stance into advocacy. When the conference met in early 1943 and cast its lot with Zionism, two of the largest Jewish organisations the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor Committee walked out in protest. Anyway, Klutznick continues, that meeting started a movement that stayed alive for four years. It also brought him for the first time in close association with Nahum Goldmann. Klutznick and Goldmann wanted the American Jewish Conference to be permanent. In this effort, Klutznick battled to win the support of Bnai Brith. It was an enormous fight, and we lost, Klutznick recalls. The bruises were still felt ten years later when Klutznick became president of Bnai Brith. His first decision put him at odds with Goldmann, who wanted him to help re-create the American Jewish Conference. Despite his earlier effort, Klutznick now felt it would be divisive. I looked him square in the eye and said, 'Im not going to do it. If I tried it now it would split Bnai Brith right down the middle. At this moment Bnai Brith is too weak. I need these people together. Klutznick told him he would go all the way on a program for a Jewish homeland, but he had what he believed to be a better plan for coordination of American Jews, an organisation consisting of just the presidents of the major organisations. For one thing, the leaders needed to get acquainted with each other. Believe it or not, Klutznick recalls, many had attained these high positions without even meeting the presidents of other major organisations. Klutznick told Goldmann: If we really want to do something, the presidents are the powerhouses. Goldmann agreed to the plan. Klutznieks recalls changes: The fact is during the 1950s people werent as intense as they are now. As an example, he cites the Jewish response to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged US help to any nation in the Middle East threatened by international Communism. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion opposed a commitment that sweeping, arguing that it could lead to US support for nations hostile to Israel. The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organisations decided to support the US position. Klutznick recalls the confrontation. I presided at that meeting, and we took the position that we should not oppose the president of the United States, and we didnt. In those days, he said after a long pause, we could have those arguments. There was mutual tolerance. Dealing with Israeli officials sometimes tested Klutznicks tolerance. In 1955 the U.S. was horrified at the Israeli massacre of Arab civilians in the Gaza raid, and Klutznick, as president of Bnai Brith, reported the reaction to Jerusalem. He told Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett: Moshe, it was terrible. It wasnt the fact Israeli forces were defending Israel. It was the overwhelming response. It looked like a disregard for the value of human life. After a pause, the prime minister answered quietly, You know, Phil, I did not even know this was taking place. He [Defence Minister David Ben Gurion] did this on his own. I hope you will tell him what you told me. Klutznick met Ben Gurion the next day. It wasnt long before he said. 'Phil, what was the reaction to the Gaza raid? It was exactly the same question Sharett had asked, and I gave exactly the same answer. Klutznick was astonished at Ben Gurions response: He stood up. He looked like an angry prophet out of the Bible and got red in the face. He shouted, 'I am not going to let anybody, American Jews or anybody else, tell me what I have to do to provide for the security of my people. When the prime minister stood up, Klutznick stood up too. Ben Gurion asked, Why are you standing up? Klutznick answered, Well, obviously I have offended you, and I assume that our discussion is over. Ben Gurion said, Sit down. Lets talk about something else. Klutznick recalls, Thats the way it happened. So help me God. Thats just the way it happened, and we had a wonderful talk. Klutznick says Ben Gurion could be as tough or tougher than Begin, but when he had made his point he could go back to being friends. Klutznick had a similar experience years later with Prime Minister Begin. In the wake of the Camp David Accords, President Carter called in Klutznick and seven other Jewish leaders. The president said, Look, I need some help. I think I can handle [Egyptian President] Sadat. We have an understanding, but I am not sure that I can convince the Prime Minister [Begin]. One of the group interrupted and changed the subject: Mr. President, Israel is upset because there will be arms sent to Arab countries. There is already a bill pending, as you know. Then the next man said, Cant you do something to make it more comfortable for Israel? Several men in a row spoke in a similar vein. Klutznick noted Carters irritation and undertook the role of peacemaker: Mr. President, I dont think weve quite got your message. There are all of these requests for arms. I think what my colleagues are trying to say, if I may interpret them, is whether there is some way to defer these requests until the negotiations are over. I dont think it is for us with our limited knowledge to tell you who should get arms and who should not. He recalls, I said that if the 'questions of arms sales had to be answered during the Camp David negotiations, whichever way the president answered them would be difficult. Klutznick says he added, And I am not here representing anybody except you. Mr. President. Our country has to back you as fairly as it can. Klutznicks remarks got the discussion back on the track Carter wanted, but they were badly twisted in a news report published the next day in Israel, where Klutznick was quoted as having told Carter that he was at the White House meeting representing Egypt, not Israel. He had, of course, said nothing of the kind and sent a cable to Begin denying the story. The next day when reporters asked about the incident, Begin said simply, I have received a cable from President Klutznick of the World Jewish Congress. He denies any such statement was made, and thats the end of it. But that was not the end of it. Klutznick flew to Israel in a few days for previously scheduled meetings, including an appointment with Begin. Klutznick recalls the frosty scene. It was the first time Begin did not stand up and greet him with an embrace. Klutznick spoke first: Look, Menachem, I know you are angry, but Im the one thats angry and entitled to be. When you told the press you got a cable from Klutznick and he denies it and thats the end of it is that the right thing to say? I say no. If someone had said that about you to me, I would have said, 'I had a cable from the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister denies it. And Ive known the Prime Minister for a long time, and his word is good enough for me. Begin turned to his assistant and said, Get that cable. He read a cable from his ambassador to the United States which gave an inaccurate account of what Klutznick had told Carter, and asked, What would you have done? Klutznick responded, 1 would have fired the ambassador. In his cable he wasnt writing about Phil Klutznick. He was writing about the president of the World Jewish Congress. If he had any such information his first duty was to call me, not you. He never called me. Overcome with emotion, Begin stood and embraced his visitor. Despite such shows of affection, Klutznick did not pull punches in his criticism of Begins later policies and his recommendations on what the U.S. government should do. In 1981 he deplored the Israeli air attacks, first on the Iraqi nuclear installation and then in Lebanon. Later that year he travelled to the Middle East with Harold Saunders, a former career specialist on the Middle East who served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs under President Carter, former diplomat Joseph H. Greene, Jr., and Merle Thorpe, Jr., president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. On returning, Klutznick joined in the groups conclusion that the Camp David peace process was not enough and that the Palestine Liberation Organisation should be brought into negotiations. Later in the year, when Saudi Arabia announced its eight-point peace plan, Klutznick called it useful and argued that Israel at least should listen to it. All of these positions, of course, were violently opposed by Israel and its US lobby. But Klutznick was not deterred, in mid-1982 in the Los Angeles Times and other major newspapers Klutznick wrote: It is up to the Reagan Administration to face the realities of the Middle East as boldly as did the Carter Administration. The first step is to halt the conflict in Lebanon immediately and have Israels forces withdrawn. This must be followed by an enlarged peace process that includes all parties to the conflict including Palestinians. Only by doing so without apology and with determination can America pursue its own best interests, promote Israels long-term well-being and protect world peace. Despite public condemnation for these statements from the Jewish leadership in the United States, Klutznick privately received praise: When I opposed the Iraqi raid, my mail from Jews was about four to one supportive and about three to one when I proposed dealing directly with the PLO, he recalls. But, you know, some of that support has to be discounted. There are people in the Jewish community who will assure me of their support even when they think Im wrong. Many more believed him wrong and said so. Abbot Rosen, Midwest director of the Anti-Defamation League in Chicago, rejected Klutznicks proposal to bring the PLO into the peace process and to establish a state for the Palestinians as pie in the sky. He reported to the Chicago Sun-Times one of the lobbys tired cliches, Under the present political circumstances, another Palestinian state, adjacent to Israel and Jordan, would provide an additional Soviet foothold in the region. Robert Schrayer, chairman of the Public Affairs Committee of the Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago, joined the protest with another shibboleth: Since no sovereign nation can be expected to negotiate its own destruction, Israel should not be pressured to negotiate with the PLO. The Near East Report, a weekly newsletter published by the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, editorialized against Klutznicks views, and accused him of promoting a sinister canard in calling the Palestinians a special people in the Arab world, in some ways like the Jews were in the West following World War II. The next year Klutznick took his crusade to Paris, where he joined forces with his old, ailing compatriot, Nahum Goldmann, and Pierre Mends-France, a Jew and a former prime minister of France, in a plea to end Israels war in Lebanon. Klutznicks reason for going to Paris was to attend a meeting of the World Jewish Congress, but as soon as he landed, Goldmann, then living in Paris and critically ill, told him. Weve got to get fifty of the most distinguished Jews of the world to sign a statement to bring this war in Lebanon to an end. Klutznick responded, But, first, lets see if we can write a statement. Goldmann agreed and took up the subject at lunch the next day with Mends-France, Le Monde correspondent Eric Rouleau, and Klutznick, agreeing to consider a draft statement the next day. That night Klutznick, with the help of his aide, Mark Bruzonsky, wrote a brief statement which became the basis for the next days discussion. Klutznick recalls the scene, Mends-France is one of the best editors Ive seen in my life. He would look at a word in typical French fashion in several languages, turning it around every which way. Four hours later, after sitting there fighting over every word, we had a statement. Its conclusion was forceful: The real issue is not whether the Palestinians are entitled to their rights, but how to bring this about while ensuring Israels security and regional stability. Ambiguous concepts such as 'autonomy are no longer sufficient, for they too often are used to confuse rather than to clarify. Needed now is the determination to reach a political accommodation between lsrael and Palestinian nationalism. The war in Lebanon must stop. Israel must lift its seige of Beirut in order to facilitate negotiations with the PLO, leading to a political settlement. Mutual recognition must be vigorously pursued. And there should be negotiations with the aim of achieving co-existence between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples based on self-determination. When it was finished, Klutznick asked, What do we do with the damned thing? Goldmann said, Weve got to get those other fellows. Branch out and find them. Klutznick protested that there was not enough time and suggested that Goldmann and Mends-France issue it in their own names. The former prime minister said. Ive never done anything like that. I dont sign statements with other people. Goldmann and Rouleau added their encouragement, and, finally, Mends-France said, Ill sign provided you can get an immediate answer from Yasser Arafat. Isam Sartawi, a close associate of Arafat, was in Paris at the time and arranged this response by the PLO leader: Coming at this precise moment from three Jewish personalities of great worth, worldwide reputation, and definite influence at all levels, both on the international scene and within their own community, that statement takes on a significant importance. Klutznick took the podium at the meeting of the World Jewish Congress, then underway in Paris, to explain the declaration. The atmosphere, he recalls, was anything but cordial: Heated is not the right word. If it had been heated it would have been better. It was sullen, solemn and bitter. I tried to have the delegates understand why we spoke up as we did. I told them it was the first such statement Mends-France had ever made. And I said they also should know that Nahum Goldmann does what he thinks is right. And hes not been condemned just once. Hes been condemned many times in the past by those who later chose to follow him. The declaration brought headlines around the world, wide discussion, and some editorial praise. But it received little support among leading Jews and was largely rejected by Jewish organisations as unrepresentative and unhelpful. It was Goldmanns last public statement. He died within a month, and a month later Mends-France also died. A few Jews helped Klutznick defend the statement. Newton N. Minow, a prominent Chicagoan who served in the Kennedy administration, praised Klutznicks exemplary lifetime of leadership to Jewish causes and Israel and his independence and thoughtful criticism in a column published in the Chicago Sun-Times. As an American Jew pondering past mistakes, I believe that the American Jewish community has made some serious blunders in the past few years by choosing to remain silent when we disagreed with Israeli government policy. Shortly after the Paris declaration, the world was horrified by the massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian camps at Beirut. After four months of silence, Klutznick spoke at a luncheon in New York in February 1983. He launched a new crusade, pleading for the right of Jews to dissent: We cannot be one in our need for each other, and be separated in our ability to speak or write the truth as each of us sees it. The real strength of Jewish life has been its sense of commitment and willingness to fight for the right [to dissent] even among ourselves. In November, Klutznick took his crusade to Jerusalem, attending, along 'with forty other Jews from the United States and fifteen other countries, a four-day meeting of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East. Klutznick drew applause when he told his audience, which included several Israelis: If you listen to us when we speak good of Israel then you must listen to us when we speak ill. Otherwise we will lose our credibility, and the American government will not listen to us at all. Despite his proven commitment to Israel, his leadership in the Jewish community and his unquestioned integrity, Philip Klutznick today is rejected or scorned by many of his establishment contemporaries. Two professionals in the Jewish lobby community, for example, say simply that Klutznick is not listened to any longer. One of them adds sadly, I admire Phil Klutznick but he is virtually a non-person in the Jewish community. The other is harsh and bitter, linking Klutznick with other critics of the Israeli government as an enemy of the Jewish people. Charles Fishbein, for 11 years a fundraiser and executive of the Jewish National Fund, provides a partial explanation for the treatment Klutznick has received: When you speak up in the Jewish community without a proper forum, you are shunted aside. You are dismissed as one who has been 'gotten to. Its non-sense, but it is effective. The Jewish leaders you hear about tend to be very very wealthy givers. Some give to Jewish causes primarily as an investment, to establish a good business and social relationship. Such people will not speak up for a non-conformist like Klutznick for fear of jeopardizing their investment. These thoughts echo that of Klutznick himself: Try to understand. See it from their standpoint. Why should they go public? They dont want any trouble. They are a part of the community. They have neighbours. They help out. They contribute. He pauses, purses his lips a bit, then adds, They have standing. And they want to keep it. Klutznick smiles. They say to me, 'You are absolutely right in what you say and do, but I cant. I cant speak up as you do. Another pause. Maybe I would be the same if I hadnt gotten all the honors the Jewish community can give me. He sees Washington policy as a major obstacle to reforming the lobbys tactics: Lets not underestimate the damage that our own government does. Our government has been writing blank cheques to Israel for a long time. As a result Begin would come over here for a tour, then go back home and say, 'What are you complaining about? I go to the United States, where the government supports me and all the leaders of the Jewish community applaud and support me. A Growing Gap in Our Liberal Tradition Jews never had it so good as theyve had in the United-States, muses I. F. Stone, one of Americas most respected Jewish journalists who calls himself a radical. Famous for his periodical, I.F. Stones Weekly, which he issued for 19 years, and for his independent views, he discontinued the weekly because, as he says with typical self-mockery, he became tired of solving the problems of the entire world every week. Seventy-six years old and with eyesight so weak he has difficulty reading even large type, he is anything but retired. He is still a hero on campuses across the country and in liberal circles for his views on non-Middle East topics. Indeed, on those themes his following is enthusiastic. A recent lecture series on the trial of Socrates was a sell out. Israel is on the wrong course, he says sadly, peering through the thick lenses of his eyeglasses. This period is the blackest in the history of the Jewish people. Arabs need to be dealt with as human beings. I am gloomy about the future, he says. He can name no one with the promise to lead Israel out of its disastrous policies. The conversation drifts to American Jews who dissent, and Stone recalls the day a publisher invited him to lunch and asked him to delete from a book he had written a passage recommending major changes in Israeli policy. The book, Underground to Palestine, deals mainly with Stones experiences travelling with Jews from Nazi camps as they made their way through the British blockade to what is now Israel. The offending part was Stones recommendation of a binational solution, a state whose constitution would recognise the presence at two peoples, two nations, Arab and Jewish, to encompass all of Palestine. Stone refused to delete it, and as he wrote in the New York Review of Books, that ended the luncheon, and in a way, the book. It was in effect proscribed. According to Jewish journalist Carolyn Toll. From then on, Stone, who might have been a hero on the synagogue lecture circuit as the first American newsman to travel with Holocaust survivors, was banned in any Jewish arena by leaders determined to close the debate on binationalism and statehood. In Israel, where Jews establish their identity by birth rather than membership in an organisation, Stone would be a full-fledged dissident. But in the American climate of insecurity about non-Jewish majority views, such arbitrary loyalty tests have not been challenged by the same Jews who vehemently champion others rights to speak freely. Two years later, Stones book was published in Hebrewin Israelwith the offending passage intact and read widely in the Middle East. While he objects to the excesses of the lobby, Stone understands the motivations: The Jewish people are apprehensive, fearful. They are afraid about the future. They feel they are at war, and many of them feel they have to fight and keep fighting. He adds, after a pause, When people are at war it is normal for civil liberties to suffer. Stone sees a dangerous gap growing in this liberal tradition: I find myselflike many fellow American intellectuals, Jewish and non-Jewishostracised whenever I try to speak up on the Middle East, [while] dissidents, Jewish and non-Jewish, in the Soviet Union are, deservedly, heroes. But in the United States they are anything but heroes: It is only rarely that we dissidents on the Middle East can enjoy a fleeting voice in the American press. Finding an American publishing house willing to publish a book which departs from the standard Israeli line is about as easy as selling a thoughtful exposition of atheism to the Osservatore Romano in Vatican City. Those who speak up pay a price, says Stone, noting that journalists with long records of championing Israeli causes are flooded with Jewish hate mail, accusing them of anti-Semitism if they dare express one word of sympathy for Palestinian Arab refugees. In an essay in the Washington Post on August 19, 1977, Stone voiced his concern over Bible diplomacy, particularly the effort to cite the Bible as the justification for Israels continued control over the West Bank: In the Middle Ages, as everyone knows, the Bible was under lock and key. The clergy kept it away from the masses lest it confuse them and lead to schism and sedition. . Maybe its time to lock the Holy Book up again, at least until the Israeli-Arab dispute is settled. Anti-Zionist Jews Two American Jews, Elmer Berger and Alfred M. Lilienthal, Jr., have much in common. From the very beginning they warned against Zionism, forecasting grave danger to Judaism in the establishment of a Jewish state, without apparent trepidation they separated themselves from what has become the mainstream of Jewish thinking and devoted their lives to a lonely, frustrating and controversial crusade to alter the policies of the state of Israel. Long after Israel was established, broadly recognised and supported by the world community, they continued to make a case against the Jewish states. Both are often scorned as 'self-hating Jews. Both Lilienthal and Berger persist in their crusades despite attacks. The two are constantly on lecture tours, write extensively and appear at forums. They are as well known in the Arab world as in the United States, and more honored there than here. In personality, the two have little in common. Lilienthal began as a lawyer, Berger as a rabbi. Lilienthal is a hard-hitting advocate in manner and speech his mood shifts rapidly. Thoughtful and subdued one moment, he can be challenging the next. Berger, by contrast, is 'calm and unruffled, a patient listener. Even when his words thunder, his delivery is that of the soothing cleric. Each has his audience, but neither has many outspoken disciples. The people who read the Likenthal newsletter, Middle East Perspective, and follow his activities may not be numerous, but his books are found in public and personal libraries throughout the country and are frequently cited in speeches and articles. Rabbi Elmer Bergers circle may be smaller stillinternational audiences are hard to measurebut it appears loyal. When he sponsored a two-day seminar in May 1983 at the Madison Hotel in Washington, D.C., the gathering attracted over 200 people, principally journalists, scholars, clergy, public officials and diplomats. All had at least two things in common: an interest in the Arab-Israeli dispute and affection for Elmer Berger. Lilienthal began his crusade against Israel soon after the government came into being in 1948 and at the age of seventy had not let up when I interviewed him in 1984. His 1949 Readers Digest article, Israels Flag Is Not Mine, warned of the consequences of Zionism. His first book, What Price Israel in 1953 was followed by There Goes the Middle East in 1957 and The Other Side of the Coin eight years later. In 1978 Lilienthal published his largest and most comprehensive work, The Zionist Connection, which focuses on the development and activities of the Zionist movement within the United States. An impressive 872-page volume studded with facts, quotations, anecdotes and, here and there, colorful opinions and interpretations, it was described by Foreign Affairs quarterly as the culminating masterwork of Lilienthals anti-Zionist career. By 1984, his crusade had taken Lilienthal to the Middle East twenty-two times and across the United States twenty-si