Momin Iftikhar Finally the answers to 30 posers from Pakistan, on the evidence given in the Indian dossier on the Mumbai Strikes have arrived after a wait of over one month - with the Indian exhortations to show results post haste. On its own part, what has taken India so long in responding to Pakistani queries is perplexing; after all what is the caveat in sharing intelligence related to terrorists' linkages to Pakistani soil in an expeditious if not real time manner. Given the dossier's obvious shortfalls one can't help feeling that it hides as much as it bares or what else explains the absence of alacrity and objectivity in the Indian attitude in exchanging evidence since the trail ought to be turning cold with the delay of every passing day. Dossiers of late have earned notoriety as documents which carry a compilation of evidence that serves to layout the contrived casus belli - a fabricated justification for resorting to aggression. The 'dodgy' epithet was coined when US and UK both issued dossiers on Iraq that tabulated the evidence compiled by the CIA and the MI-6 to prove a point that Iraq was engaged in developing weapons of mass destruction. Given the selective nature of its content, the Indian dossier concerning the Mumbai terrorist strikes in Nov 2006, too, strongly vies for a rank alongside these patchy predecessors. It is for the second time - the first being the one related to the Mumbai Train attacks in 2006 - that an Indian dossier has proven dodgy on credibility graph and exposes the country's propensity for rhetoric over substance in conducting (coercive) diplomacy with Pakistan. The Composite Dialogue Process (CDP), starting in Jan 2004 has remained hostage to the incidents of terrorism occurring in India. A precarious roadblock emerged in July 2006 when the Mumbai suburban train system was struck by serial bombing whereby bombs detonated within minutes of each other on seven different trains during the evening peak hours. 186 people were killed and over 1,000 injured in the strikes. In terms of sheer carnage the incident surpassed the recent strike in the much-bloodied metro. Indian Premier then promised to confront Pakistan with evidence - a damning dossier - that would confirm involvement of 11 Pakistanis and the ISI in the episode. Many months later once the dossier was delivered it was a pale shadow of what was promised - a fact even acknowledged by the Indian national security adviser. As things stand, even after passage of 32 months Indian enquiries are still continuing, there is no mention of Pakistan's involvement and a few activists of the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) have been rounded up as dubious perpetrators of the crime. The attack on Samjhota Express on February 18, 2007 killed 63 persons, mostly Pakistanis and the entire Indian establishment took pains to convince the world that Pakistan was involved in the incident. By way of evidence, what all India had to pass on to Pakistan in March 2007, at the forum of the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism, was the head of a suicide bomber - allegedly a Pakistani who had reportedly disappeared in India in 2006. What has emerged finally is the involvement of the Hindu Right where by a serving military officer Lt Col Prasad Prohit, a Hindu priestess Pragya Thakur and a retired Army officer Dayanand Pandey have been apprehended for their role in the Pakistani specific terrorist attack. Even the SIMI activists, India's favorite whipping boys, are absent in the emerging picture of the crime. Indian response to the latest Mumbai strikes remains true to the established pattern; loud rhetoric and little solid evidence. While one could have previously complained about paucity of evidence available to Indian investigators, the recent Mumbai attackers left behind a bonanza of clues, even the physical custody of an attacker - Ajmal Kasab. Given the Pakistani willingness to investigate all leads, it is disappointing that the Indian dossier lacks in providing solid verifiable leads - a deficit which slices through the hamstring of entire investigative effort in Pakistan. In contrast Pakistan's response to the dossier has been quick and credible. FIA has initiated a FIR against eight suspects, of whom six are in custody and under interrogation. But as any police officer would testify, without solid verifiable evidence dead ends are reached quickly and that is what is happening to investigations in Pakistan. On February 12, Pakistan, in a note verbale sought answers to vital missing links which included gaps in Ajmal Kasab's interrogation and intercepted telephone conversations between the terrorists. The thirty posers, in addition to seeking the left out evidence, pointed to some (deliberate?) blind spots in the Indian investigative effort; the possible role of the Hindu Right in knocking off Mumbai ATS Chief Hemant Karkare during the strike and contributions made by the local accomplices of the terrorists in providing logistics for the attack and even participating in it. It is meaningful to note that Indians have not been forthcoming in providing details of the interrogation of the two men, Tausif Rehman and Mukhtar Ahmad sheikh who have been arrested for providing Indian SIM cards to the attackers. Pakistan is not the only party clamoring for evidence related to Mumbai strikes; even the Interpol remains stymied by an uncalled for Indian obsession to sit tight on evidence. "The information that Interpol has about what happened in Mumbai is the same information that you have - it is information that was read in journals, that was read on the internet or that was seen on TV," complained Interpol Chief Ronald Noble in Islamabad. "To date, India's Government has not authorized India's police agencies to enter any data relating to the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai into Interpol's data bases," he added. It is becoming manifest that India has grossly overstated its case of victimization from terrorism originating from Pakistan to the neglect of the domestic angle. Unless India squarely faces up to this tough issue, the incidents are likely to proliferate. In this context it is apt to remind that since Nov 2006 a Joint Anti Terrorism Forum formally exists for sharing information on incidents of terrorism that threaten to derail the peace process that is now in its fifth year. By persisting in its refusal to activate the existing channels for sharing counter terrorism evidence and even shunning a helping hand from Interpol, India is only strengthening suspicions that it is talking half truths for securing political mileage at home and abroad and resorting to blame game primarily for scoring propaganda points against Pakistan. In the meanwhile Pakistan and the world at large keep their fingers crossed for the next homegrown incident of terrorism in India, that is bound to materialize - and materialize sooner rather than later